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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
U T A H S T A T E ROAD
COMMISSION,
Plaintiff'Appellant,
vs.

Case No.
13544

T H E STEELE RANCH,
a Utah Corporation, et. al.,
Defendant-Respondent.

BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a condemnation action by the Utah State
Road Commission to acquire certain real property in
Juab County for the purpose of constructing a Project
of the 1-15 Freeway.
DISPOSITION I N T H E L O W E R COURT
The case was tried to a jury on September 20,21,
1973. The jury assessed damages for the condemnation
as follows:
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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Market value of property taken .... $21,164.50
Severance damages to remaining
property
$75,000.00
Total
$96,164.50
The State Road Commission made a motion for a new
trial which was denied by the District Court. The Commission thereupon brought this appeal.
R E L I E F S O U G H T ON A P P E A L
Respondent seeks to have the judgment of the
trial court affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent agrees with appellant's statement of
the facts with the exception of noting that Dr. Steele's
home is an integral part of the ranch operations. Dr.
Steele directs the operations of his ranch from his home.
The yard adjacent to the home contains the bulk of the
other ranch buildings. These facts, repeatedly evidenced
in the record, (Tr. 90, 93, 121, 130) were omitted in
appellant's statement of facts. The occupation of Dr.
Steele is that of a medical doctor and a rancher. (Tr. 86)
The use of the title doctor alone for Dr. Steele is misleading. I t is not indicative of the management of the
ranch by Dr. Steele.
The house and yard were owned by Dr.
personally and the balance of the ranch by the
Ranch corporation of which he was the owner of
outstanding capital stock. The ranch was then

Steele
Steele
all the
leased
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indefinitely by Dr. Steele. The separation of the properties was directed by Dr. Steele's attorney for particular tax benefits and for estate planning. (Tr. 93)
ARGUMENT
POINT I
T H E R E WAS AMPLE COMPETENT
E V I D E N C E TO S U P P O R T
THE
JURY'S VERDICT.
Introduction:
Dr. Steele testified as to the value of his ranch.
Nichols on Eminent Domain at § 18.4(2) states:
Although there is authority to the contrary, the owner of the land taken is generally
held to be qualified to express his opinion of
its value merely by virtue of his ownership. H e
is deemed to have sufficient knowledge of the
price paid, the rents or other income received,
and the possibilities of the land for use, to have
a reasonably good idea of what it is worth.
The weight of his testimony is for the jury,
. . . . (emphasis added)
In Salt Lake N U.B. CO. V. Schramm et. al., 56
Utah 53, 189 P.90 (1820), an eminent domain case in
which one of the owners had resided on the premises
all her life and had made frequent inquiries into the
value of her property, the Utah Supreme Court said
that it was proper to allow the owner to give opinion
evidence as to the value of the land.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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We do not think any good reason can be
assigned why a person who has occupied and
used the premises all her life, and has been interested and alert in making inquiry as to its
value, may not be as well qualified to speak as
the banker, lawyer, or real estate man, having
more or less to do with the sales and transfers
of real property. The means and extent of the
knowledge of any witness may be gone into
on cross-examination, and rebutted as to value.
No rule can be formulated for determining
the means by which a witness shall acquire the
necessary knowledge to qualify him to speak
that will apply in all cases. If, under all circumstances, he was in a position to obtain knowledge and form a correct judgment as to values,
whether or not by buying, selling, leasing, or
using the property for purposes for which it
is adaptable is immaterial, so long as the jury
is given the benefit of the facts upon which
opinion of the witness is based, (emphasis
added)
In another eminent domain preceeding, State v.
Dillree, 25 Utah 2d 184, 478 P.2d 507, (1970), the Utah
Supreme Court said,
Mr. Dillree being an owner of the property, together with his wife, was a competent
witness as to the value of the property taken
and as to severance damages incurred.
The trial record is replete with testimony indicating Dr. Steele, the landowner, was well qualified to
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

5
render an opinion as to the value of his ranch. The
doctor-rancher had for a period of fifteen years purchased numerous pieces of property as additions to his
ranch. (Tr. 88) These many purchases alone would give
him a working knowledge of real estate values in this
locality. In addition, Dr. Steele was engaged in the
daily operations of his ranch. (Tr. 94) On the basis
of this managerial involvement, Dr. Steele testified in
profuse detail as to the basis for his estimate of severance damages to his ranch. (Tr. 117, 118, 118, 120, 130,
131).
The adequate basis of the Doctor's testimony is to
be vividly contrasted with the dubious testimony given
by Victor M. Smith, the State of Utah's expert witness.
H e had never owned or operated a ranch. (Tr. 227).
In Mr. Smith's opinion the nearness of the freeway had
no effect on the valuation of the Doctor's home. (Tr.
236, 237). H e was oblivious to any intrusion on the
privacy to Dr. Steele's home as well as to any adverse
aesthetic effects of the freeway. (Tr. 237). Mr. Smith
had limited formal training as an appraiser. (Tr. 224).
Respondent argues that to label Mr. Smith's testimony
as expert and to simultaneously invidiously characterize Dr. Steele's testimony as "inexpert," as appellant
in its brief does, is a gross distortion of reality. The
jury had a duty to weigh and did evaluate the testimony
of Dr. Steele, the landowner, and Mr. Smith, appellant's
real estate expert.
Respondents submit that courts should be extremely
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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cautious in setting aside jury verdicts. Courts must not
invade the legitimate province of the jury which is to
weigh the evidence. The weighing of the evidence adduced in order to determine the value of real estate in
a land condemnation case is extremely subjective.
Nichols on Eminent Domain at § 18.4 states,
The value of a particular piece of real
estate cannot be definitely determined by the
application of any exact principle of science,
and even after all the possible information bearing upon the question has been weighed by a
person well qualified to judge, the real value
still remains a matter of opinion, (emphasis
added)
Nevertheless despite the highly subjective nature
of making evaluations of real estate, it is appellants
argument that the testimony of a real estate expert
should be dispositive. Their brief on page 14 states,
I n the Dillree case Justice Henriod dissented arguing that the defendant should be
bound by the testimony of his own expert witness. His logic is instructive in this case, (emphasis added)
The entire tenor of appellant's argument is that the
jury is bound by an expert's testimony. Their brief
speaks of the verdict being "grossly excessive over the
experts opinion." If one were to take seriously appellant's argument that the jury is locked in by an expert's
testimony then the jury itself would be superflous.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Fortunately for the judicial system this is not the case.
Nichols on Eminent Domain at § 18-1 states,
Generally, the arbiter of the facts, in
valuing the land appropriated are not limited
to the knowledge which they acquire from the
evidence adduced
Value is always a matter
of opinion. The opinions of expert witnesses are
merely advisory. If they agree with common
sense and human experience well and good.
If, however, they differ from ordinary observation, human experience and common sense
they may well be ignored, (emphasis added)
The correct function of expert and opinion evidence in land condemnation cases was set forth at 27
Am.Jur. 2d at 317 as follows :
Essentially, the value of land appropriated by eminent domain is a question to be
established by expert testimony. Indeed, the
value of a parcel of land taken by eminent
domain is always a matter of opinion and may
be proved by opinion evidence . . . . The opinions of experts as to value, however, are not to
be passively received and blindly followed, but
are to be weighed by the jury and judged in
view of all the testimony in the case and the
jury's own general knowledge of affairs, and
are to be given only such consideration as the
jury may believe them entitled to receive, (emphasis added)
Since no error was assigned by the appellant to the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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jury instructions given, the respondent would assume
they were proper. The instructions stated (R. 135):
Your are to consider the testimony of all
witnesses, but if after a consideration of all the
evidence in this case, you believe that any witness who has testified to the value of the land
and the damage by reason of severance thereto
gave testimony which is not the reasonable
value thereof, you may disregard that testimony even though it comes from an expert.
(emphasis added)
The instructions also (R. 139) informed the jury to
evaluate the testimony of the landowner on the basis of
his experience and qualifications and then give it whatever weight they deemed proper. Respondents argue
that this is precisely what the jury did.
There was an enormous range in testimony as to
the damages incurred, for example, the plaintiff's expert fixed damages at $39,303.20, the defendant's expert said $68,299.75, and the landowner fixed damages
at $127,852.00. Such discrepancies in value make the
advisory capacity of such testimony to the jury even
more imperative. Such extremes are to be expected and
arise from the almose incredible complexities involved
in the task of valuation.
Appellants in their brief state that the jury "chose
to completely ignore the testimony of either expert
appraiser." They also assert that the jury chose the
"personal, inexpert, unobjective feelings of Dr. Steele
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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rather than the clear preponderance of expert opinion
based upon market values and experience." There is
no evidence in the record which affords even a scintilla
of support to such a sheer guess as to what went on in
the minds of the jurors. I t is pure speculation of the
most blantant type which overlooks Dr. Steele's expertise.
Appellants had ample opportunity in their crossexamination of Dr. Steele to reveal any deficiencies in
his testimony. The factual basis of his testimony remained unscathed after appellant's cross-examination.
The court in Board of County Commissioners of
El Paso County v. Barron, 28 Colo. App. 283, 487
P.2d 579, (1971), an eminent domain case, said,
Simply because the jury chose one end of
the spectrum rather than the middle or lower
end is not in itself grounds for reversal, provided there is competent evidence to support
the higher figure.
Respondents argue that Dr. Steele's testimony constitutes competent evidence; that an experts opinion
evidence is not to usurp the function of a jury; that
the jury did in fact utilize the experts testimony but only
in it's proper advisory context; that the jury did in fact
evaluate the testimony of the landowner and found such
testimony competent because it had a substantial basis
in fact; that this finding was consequently reflected in
the verdict of damages of $96,164.50 which figure was
well within the upper spectrum of competent testimony.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Further it is obvious from the jury's verdict that
they took the experts opinion as to the values of the
land taken and Dr. Steele's value as to severance damage. (Tr. 153-157) (Tr. 220-224) (Tr. 115, 117)
POINT II
T H E VERDICT WAS NOT EXCESSIVE.
The sole issue to be resolved by the trial court was
the value of the property acquired by the State Road
Commission and the resulting serevance damages to the
remainder of the Steele Ranch. How much is just compensation to be paid by the State of Utah? What constitutes an excessive verdict?
A verdict based upon substantive evidence must
be upheld unless the award is so excessive so as to "shock
the enlightened conscience of the court." This is the
common-law legal criteria determining if an award is
excessive. Nichols on Eminent Domain at § 17.3 on
land condemnation cases states,
. . . . the legal criteria for a determination of
whether an award is inadequate or excessive
so as to warrant adverse action by the court,
are said to be similar to those which govern in
common-law actions. Even in the fact of conflicting evidence, the court will generally refuse to set aside the award or verdict if there
is evidence to sustain the amount awarded and
such amount is not palpably inadequate or excessive, (emphasis added)
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

11
Respondents are cognizant of the lattitude allowed
by the statement " shock the enlightened conscience of
the court" for this is a relative term. Yet, nowhere does
the State apply this common-law criteria that the verdict
must "shock the enlightened conscience of the court."
The nearest approach are their words "to affirm such
a grossly excessive award." These words however, in
their brief are used in the limited context of grossly excessive relative to respondent's expert witnesses valuation. This argument ignores the demonstrated expertise of Dr. Steele's testimony. If the verdict is viewed
in the context of Dr. Steele's testimony then it certainly
shocks no ones conscience. Certainly it did not shock the
conscience of the trial judge.
The cases cited by appellant on excessive damages
are distinguishable. In State v. Silliman, 22 Utah 2d
33, 448 P2d 347, (1958), one of the reasons the verdict
was set aside was because of the palpable ignorance of
the subject matter manifested by the witnesses. This is
not true in the instant case.
The case of State Highway Commission v. Barnes,
443 P.2d 16, (Mont. 1968), was remanded because a
foundation was not laid that the owner had some peculiar
means of framing an intelligent and correct judgment
as to the value of the property. The court said that the
owners testimony was "not only conjecture but highly
speculative." This is in sharp contrast with the instant
case in which Dr. Steele exhibited his detailed knowledge
of the ranching operations and the severance by the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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highway upon these operations with the consequent impairment of the ranch's value. The appellants in their
brief made a minor error in alleging the jury in the
Barnes case returned a value above the expert's opinion.
The jury, in fact, awarded a total of $44,379 which was
much lower than the experts total valuation of $61,680.
Respondents argue that the question of the excessiveness of an award is obviously not amenable to any
fixed formula. The facts peculiar to each case, in the
light of general principles of valuation, are determinative. I n order for a verdict to be judged excessive it
must shock the enlightened conscience of the court. Respondents submit that in applying such legal criteria,
as governs common-law actions, that a verdict of $96,164.50 should not shock the conscience of the court. I t
is not shocking because such an amount is well within
the upper spectrum of competent testimony.
POINT III
I T W A S C O R R E C T TO A D M I T E V I D E N C E O F T H E V A L U E O F DR.
STEELE'S HOME BECAUSE UNITY
O F O W N E R S H I P I S N O T A N INV A R I A B L E R E Q U I R E M E N T TO
SEVERANCE DAMAGES.
Appellants unequivocally maintain that "severance
damages are not allowed to land which has a different
owner than that of the tract from which property was
condemned." Appellants cite the case of Jonas v. State,,
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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iv \\ is. 2d 638, 121 .\.\v . -u W J , vo A X . i t . 2d 880
(1963), as the leading case on severance damages. I t
is also cited because "the facK in that ease are similar
to those in the Steele Ranch case.1'
Neither assertion •, • »•
_ n. *••:/*,* rase JS
actually ch<-d in tlx A ! K ^notation as supporting
the vi^w /;//// //////// f// ownership

m it! not always

exist.

See \K> .! ; /' \M Annotation: Kmment Domain-Severance Damages, p. 894. The instant ease is easily distinguishable from Jonas because the ranch IN leased back
from the corporation

<Ti* o:*

while in the Jonas case

there existed no lease. T'•»• Supreme Coiirt of Wisconsin
said in Jonas t h a t :
W e might well agree thai an <^s ner of (Hitparcel (not taken) who has nsed il. and h.i
the right under lease or other contract to continue to use it, as a unit with the parcel taken
would be entitled to severance damage and the
condemnor would be compelled to pay such
damage in addition to the value of the parcel
taken, considered seperately.
Recovery of severance damages in this case, however,
was cited - n the ground of insufficiency of evidence to
show that the owner of the remaining land had any lease
: i ither contractual right to UM> the condemned land.
The court in Kessler v. State, 251 JNI.Y.S.2d 487,
(1964), said that in "unique circumstances such as those
were one individm; m.*n well have actual ownership
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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over several parcels, it would be unrealistic to treat the
parcels as seperately owned."
M.T.M. Realty Corp. v. State, 261 N.Y.S.2d 815
(1965), involved two family corporations in which the
original corporation was incorporated to acquire real
estate for residential development and the other one was
set up as a subsidiary to undertake subdivision and development of properties. The court said:
While it has been held that the mere conveyance of property by an individual to members of his immediate family does not ipso
facto constitute unity of ownership sufficient
to sustain an award of severance damages,
Kessler v. State of New York, 21 A.D.2d 568,
251 N.Y.S.2d 487, the Court is satisfied that
the corporate entities at bar were truly integrated not only by reason of family ownership
but by reason of unity of business purpose and
actual practice so as to sustain the Court's
determination to treat the parcels conveyed by
the parent to its wholly owned subsidiary as
an integrated unit.
The court in Red Apple Rest, Inc. v. State, 260
N.Y.S.2d 206, (1965), considered a claim for appropriation for highway purposes of contigious parcels of land
on both sides of a highway owned by husband and wife
and by a corporation which was in turn controlled by
the husband. The court said:
I t is our opinion that this court must,
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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under the Guptill and Kessler cases, Untk at
the realistic ownership and control >f the eontigious parcels. If we find 'actual ownership,5
we must consider contigious parcels as a single
tract,
111 Barnes v. North Cat oLuta Stau i i tulr^ ,ir .•
AVI \ i\ 378, 109 S.E.2d 219, the court held:
There is no single rule or principle established for determining the unity of lands for
the purpose of awarding damages or offsetting
benefits in eminent domain cases. The factors
most generally emphasized are unity of ownership, physical unity and unity of use . . . The
parcels claimed as a single tract must he owned
by the same party or parties. It is not a prerequisite for unity of ownership that a party
have the same quality of interest or estate in
all parts of the t r a c t . . . . However, there must
be a substantial unity of ownership, (emphasis
added)
In Stockton v. Ellingwood. *.)«> I al App. 708, 275
P.228 (1929), the court found a unity of ownership
between the part taken and the remaining part of a
large parcel of land which was in fact owned by a partnership, although the legal title to some tracts of such
land appeared in the name of one partner and other
tracts stood in the name of the other partner. The < ouri
pointed out that the lands were used a>s one pared by
the partners. The court said:
.. . . . in view of eqi lit) it is immaterial in
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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whose name the legal title to the property
stands, whether in the name of one partner or
the names of all.
To allow severance damages where a portion of a
parcel of land claimed as a single unit is taken by condemnation, unity of ownership between the part taken
and the remaining part need not always exist. Condemnation of two parts of land which have been used together for a common purpose may be allowed where
the owner of one part has a certain right or interest,
although short of ownership, on the other part. See
State ex rel. La Prade v. Carrow, 57 Ariz. 429, 114
P.2d 891, (1941); East Av. Municipal Utility Dist. v.
Kieffer, 99 Cal. App. 249, 279 P . 178 (1829); Jonas v.
State, 19 Wis.2d 638, 121 N.W.2d 235, (1963); State
ex rel. Symms v. Nelson Sand & Gravel, Inc., 93 Idaho
574, 468 P.2d 306, (1970); State ex rel State Highway
Comm. v. Gray, 81 N.M. 399, 467 P.2d 725 (1970).
Respondents submit that it is not a fixed rule that
their must invariably exist a unity of ownership between
the part taken and the remaining part; that the substantial reality of common use should and has prevailed
over any technical legal nicities; and that many courts
have so recognized such substantial realities.
P O I N T IV
T H E STEELE RANCH INCLUDED
DR. S T E E L E ' S H O M E . B O T H H O M E
A N D R A N C H W E R E O P E R A T E D TODigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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G E T H E R AS AN I N T E G R A T E D ENTITY.
Respondents argue that the in icontro verted testimony of D r . Steele was that the ranch and the home
were operated as a single unit. D r . Steele testified that
his home was "my ranch headquarters.
IV 90) H e
testified thai ihev \u-n- operated together a^ an integrated unit. (Tr. '.W • The doctor often >at on the patio
of the home checking on the cattle and purebreds. * T r
120) H e kept the ranch records at his home ( T r '?-•
The ranch and home were one integrated unit ami
were operated as such. This conclusion finds unrefuted
support in the record.
Appellants brief on page 7 alleges the ranch operation is not dependent upon the doctors home,
The day to day operation of the rao.-li
is conducted by the foreman who lives in uie
'ranch house' at the end of the county road east
of the freeway. IV I J l *
W h a t appellant's l»n<-I neglects to note are the questions
on the same page winch indicate the ranch is managed
from the home. P a g e 121 of the record reads as follows
Q

( )h, excuse me, And lli.il rmcm.-m work*
on the ranch?

i^

AJUI he performs ;..*

• .\ , . ?M r-s

tiuiis of the ranch ?
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A

Yes. I oversee and tell him in general what
I want.

Q.

And he does it and reports back to you?

XJL»

X

C/&9

•

•

•

•

The actual quotation in its entirety completely rebuts
appellants quotation.
Appellants in their brief on page 7 make the further
statements that:
While the home is near the subject tract
the ranch operation is not dependent upon the
location of a doctor's home.
Their brief on page 8 also asserts:
John Steele could live in any nearby city
without affecting the value or the operation of
the ranch, (emphasis added)
The above statements are totally unsupported by any
evidence or testimony.
Appellants brief states that none of the out buildings or corrals "which may be associated with the operation of the ranch are located on the one acre." This infers that the presence of such buildings is indispensible
to managing the ranch from the home. Respondents ask
only if it is a necessity to have the corrals on this one
acre in order to make the home an integral part of the
operation of the ranch. Obviously the answer is no.
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1 uruieniiori . these buildings arc nil adajaeent , . \\u
ranch house and ihc evidence slum1- HUE! the mic aen
separated tW ihc house ha- hv-i uf i s dimensions along
\}u rocky wall south and west ol' the house. The acre diviu n i'ro :s Hie other "yard" property is clearly a convenience description and is otherwise impractical. The ranch
buildings are only accessible from the public road
through the same gate that serves the house and the yard
for the side buildings. This was clearly demonstrated by
the aerial photographs. l\ is .tnd *\ • • = 11*1 be impossible to
separate the lit>use iiseil" i'rom Hie ranch side buildings
because of their close intimate relationship.
The principle of law is stated at 2? Am Jar.

la at

139 that *.vHh respect to agricultural and rural lands.
, if the whole area is used
er ior a
farm, ranch or other appropriate puipose, it is
to be considered one property. Moreover the
fact that different portions of a farm, ranch,
or other rural holdings were acquired from
different persons, or are otherwise held under
different titles will not prevent its being treated
as an entirety in the assessment of damages for
a taking of a part, if the whole area is held and
operated as a single property,
(emphasis
added )
Respondent submit that the mutual interest and
advantage for D r . Steele would clearly have demanded
had he decided to sell, that both tracts be treated as a
unit for purposes of evaluation by and sale to a willing
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buyer. The Steele ranch and home were inseparable,
integrated and were in fact operated as a single property.
The record amply supports such a conclusion.
POINT V
T H E JURY IMPARTIALLY RENDERED A VERDICT THAT SHOULD
BE SUSTAINED.
The appellant urge in Point I I of their brief quoting 47 Am.Jur.2d Sec. 321, that the trend of authority
is to exclude from the juries "all persons who by reason
of their business or social relations past or present, with
either of the parties, could be suspected of possible bias."
This distorts the quotation in its entirety because of
the necessary qualification which immediately follows,
Nevertheless, a person may have affiliations
and friendships, or prejudices and habits of
thought, which might lead him to look more
favorably or less favorably for one party or
the other, upon a case of a particular class or
upon a case brought by a particular person or
member of a particular class or persons than
would the average juror, which are not sufficiently pronounced to disqualify him for jury
service, (emphasis added)
The relative nature of bias was noted in 47 Am.Jur. 2d
at 846, which stated:
However, it has been said that to a greater
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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or lesser iwU-iiL i»ui> aiiii prejudice form a
trait common in all men, and, to fall within the
purview of jury disqualification, certain degrees thereof must exist.
In Siegfried v. ('//// >l Charlottesville, 206 V*i
27 1, II 12 S.E.2d .*>.")«;. (1965), the court said in a condemnation award that:
There is im h.\<-d standard to serve as a
test in all cases as to what constitutes 'bias or
misconduct of or affecting the commissioners
or jurors as will warrant setting aside the
award.' Each case must be decided upon its
own particular facts and circumstances. Temple v. Moses, 175 Va. 320, 336 8 S.E.2d 262;
'29 C.J.S. Eminent Domain :u i n 1344.
The real question is whether the requisite degree
of bias, assuming it to exist in this case, was sufficient
to disqualify the jurors who were Dr. Steele's patients.
The record was absolutely devoid of any evidence to indicate bias by these patients of Dr. Steele's. The only
possible evidence of bias is that which may be inferred
from the professional relationship per se of doctorpatient.
This precise question was considered in McCollum
> Si ah <f Florida, 74 So.2d 74, (1954), a criminal case,
which was appealed for a refusal to discharge for cause
a venireman who had sustained a physician-patient rerationship with the decedent over a course of years. The
court held that a professional relationship with the in-
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jured party in a criminal prosecution does not ipso facto
disqualify a person to serve as a juror.
In Johnson v. Allen, 108 Utah 148, 158 P.2d 134,
(1945), the court said that the existence of a debtorcreditor relationship between a party and a juror does
not ipso facto disqualify the juror where a statute merely
provides that a challenge for cause may be taken on that
ground. The debtor-creditor relationship that appellant
are concerned about on p. 9 of their brief was a $5.00
bill owing by Mr. Jones to Dr. Steele. (Tr. 9) Hardly
consequential. Furthermore, no challenge for cause was
made by appellant of this juror for that reason.
Respondent argues that when the qualifications of
a juror are attacked for bias that the trial courts decision
is subject to revision only when it has abused the wide
discretion which it is granted. The reason is that the
trial court has a better opportunity by seeing the juror
and noting his manner and demeanor while under examination. The proof of juror bias must be clear and palpable. There is nothing whatsoever in the record in the
instant case to indicate bias other than an inference from
the doctor-patient relationship and this relationship is
ipso facto not sufficient to disqualify a juror for bias.
P O I N T VI
ADMISSION OF T H E ORIGINAL APPRAISAL EVIDENCE WAS NOT
ERROR BECAUSE SUCH E V I D E N C E
W A S A D M I T T E D TO T E S T T H E
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CREDIBILITY
n
* ii~
E X P E R T WITNESS.

STATE'S

Evidence of tin original appraisal valuation was
admitted af t u The state furnished an original appraisal estimate » hidi differed from the testimony later
given hv \hr same state's expert. This original appraisal
evidence was, therefore, received by the court as impeachment evidence testing the credibility of the state's
expert, Mr. Smith. The defendant submits that contrary
to the state's assertion of error in admitting such evidence. ii dearly was not err*>r 1iccausethe credibility of a
witness is always subject to impeachment, A eorreei
perspecthr of the impact of such evidence is essential
in a land condemnation case. Nichols on Eminent Domain at £ I H. I i :* ; slates:
Moreover, the modern tendency to restrict
the setting aside of verdicts for errors which
do not cause substantial injustice is especially
noticeable in land damage cases. Such cases
usually involve a protracted and expensive
trial, and, as a rule, are determined by the consideration of a mass of separate items of evidence. The admission or exclusion of one bit of
testimony of questionable materiality is not
likely to be of vital importance ,, ,
CONCLUSION
f j l e verdict was amply supported by competent
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testimony. Applying the legal criteria governing Common-law actions the verdict is reasonable.
Technical unity of ownership is not always necessary in order to establish severance damages. Numerous
courts have so recognized and there exists no single
criteria on unity of ownership for purposes of determining damages in eminent domain cases. The home of Dr.
Steele and his ranch were inseperable and operated together as one. Dr. Steele's uncontroverted testimony
so established their integrated nature.
A relationship of doctor-patient is ipso facto insufficient to disqualify a juror for alleged bias. The
admission of the original appraisal evidence was not
error because the credibility of a witness is always subject to impeachment.
Respectfully submitted,
JACKSON HOWARD
120 East 300 North
Provo, Utah
EKS AYN ANDERSON
345 South State
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for DefendantRespondent
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